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THE ALASKAN VARIABLE: A CALL
FOR EDUCATION CLAUSE
ANALYSIS IN SCHOOL FUNDING
CASES
Sarah Laws*
ABSTRACT
The provision of public education in Alaska is a task as monumental as the state
itself, requiring innovative solutions to unique challenges faced within the
state. The drafters of the Alaska Constitution understood this dilemma and
granted the state legislature broad power under the education clause. Early
supreme court jurisprudence interpreted this mandate broadly and granted
considerable deference. However, recent school funding cases have seen the
court’s jurisprudence shift to focus on different constitutional provisions and
neglect an education clause analysis. The supreme court now has an
opportunity to change this. Alaska Legislative Council v. Dunleavy is
currently pending before the court and offers the chance to expand on the
superior court’s cursory education clause analysis. This Note argues that the
court should decide the case under an explicit education clause analysis in order
to realign its school funding jurisprudence with the early education clause
cases.

I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska is an educational paradox. “Despite some of the highest
expenditures per pupil in the country, Alaska’s K-12 education system is
plagued by poor test scores, absenteeism, and low graduation rates.”1 The
state performs admirably by any measure of school funding. Its per-pupil
spending is second highest in the nation at $18,586 per student.2 The
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1. Win Gruening, Educational Changes Will Happen Through Local Involvement,
MUST READ ALASKA (Aug. 24, 2019), https://mustreadalaska.com/educationalchanges-will-happen-through-local-involvement/.
2. BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT
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Education Law Center gives Alaska the highest possible grade for fiscal
effort, an index evaluating local and state education spending based on
the gross state product and aggregate personal income.3 However, this
spending does not correlate with K-12 outcomes. Education Week’s
Quality Counts Report Card ranks Alaska second-to-last among states in
its K-12 Achievement Index and forty-second in the Chance-for-Success
category.4 Alaska’s unique history and challenges distinguish it from
other states in many areas of everyday life, including public education,
and likely drive these disparities in spending and educational outcomes.
This “‘Alaskan variable’ must be taken into account as an important factor
in all decisions about education in Alaska.”5
The drafters of the Alaska Constitution foresaw that the Alaskan
variable would shape the public school system in Alaska.6 Thus, the
drafters granted the state legislature broad power under article VII,
section 1 of the Alaska Constitution (“education clause”), which states
that “[t]he legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a system
of public schools open to all children of the State, and may provide for
other public educational institutions.”7 The Alaska Supreme Court’s early
education clause jurisprudence reflected the weight of the Alaskan
variable in the public schooling context and tracked the drafters’ intent to
grant the legislature broad deference in the realm of public education.8
Recent public schooling cases have pivoted from litigating the broad
right of students’ access to public education to more specific challenges to
school funding mechanisms.9 The supreme court upheld the
constitutionality of two different statutory school funding schemes on
various constitutional grounds, but in neither case did the court
adequately weigh the education clause’s mandate to “establish and
CARD 10 (7th ed. 2018).
3. Id. at 15–17, 21.
4. Educational Opportunities and Performance in Alaska, EDUCATION WEEK
(Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2019/01/16/highlightsreport-alaska.html. The K-12 Achievement Index “examines 18 distinct
achievement measures.” Id. The Chance-for-Success Index is designed “to better
understand the role of education across an individual’s lifetime.” State Highlights
Reports, EDUCATION WEEK (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.edweek.org/ew/
collections/quality-counts-2020/state-and-national-highlights-reports-qualitycounts.html.
5. See Carol Barnhardt, A History of Schooling for Alaska Native People, 40 J.
AM. INDIAN EDUC. 1, 2 (2001) (“The historical, political, cultural, economic and
geographical contexts of Alaska are distinct enough from other states, that the
‘Alaskan variable’ must be taken into account as an important factor in all
decisions about education in Alaska.”).
6. See infra Section IV.C.2.
7. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
8. See infra Sections II.D.1, II.D.2.
9. See infra Section II.D.

37.1 LAWS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020

THE ALASKAN VARIABLE

6/29/2020 10:18 PM

89

maintain a system of public schools.”10 In shifting its focus away from the
education clause, the supreme court has also precluded consideration of
the Alaskan variable in public education cases. As a subset of public
schooling cases, school funding cases should be primarily analyzed under
the education clause, so long as the legislature has implemented funding
schemes pursuant to its education clause duties “to establish and
maintain a system of public schools.”11 Under this analysis, the party
challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of
demonstrating that a constitutional violation exists.12 The court should
resolve any doubts in favor of constitutionality.13 Thus, unless the party
opposing a school funding scheme demonstrates that other constitutional
factors prevail, the education clause mandate and broad legislative
discretion should dictate a presumption of constitutionality for such a
scheme.
Another statutory school funding scheme, forward funding, was
recently implicated in Alaska Legislative Council v. Dunleavy.14 In its 2018
session, the legislature forward funded K-12 education by passing
appropriations for the following fiscal year to provide school districts
with greater budgetary predictability.15 This was in response to Alaska
school districts struggling to retain quality teachers due to the budgetary
uncertainty caused by the misalignment of the fiscal year and the
academic year.16 Governor Mike Dunleavy challenged the scheme as
unconstitutional and withheld the school funding appropriations.17 In
July 2019, the Alaska State Legislature sued Governor Dunleavy to
compel payment of the past appropriations made for the forward funding
of Alaska’s public schools.18 The superior court found forward funding
10. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; see infra Sections II.D.3, II.D.4.
11. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; see infra Sections III.D.3, III.D.4.
12. State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d 86, 102 (Alaska 2016)
(Winfree, J., concurring) (citing State v. Alex, 646 P.2d 203, 209 (Alaska 1982)).
13. Id.
14. Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, Alaska Legislative
Council v. Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-00753 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2019),
https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/alc/order3.pdf.
15. Act of May 3, 2018, 2018 Alaska Sess. Laws. ch. 6.
16. ARNOLD LIEBELT, HB 287 EDUCATION AND PUPIL TRANSPORTATION: AN
EARLY AND STAND-ALONE APPROPRIATION BILL 2 (2018), http://www.akleg.gov/
basis/get_documents.asp?session=30&docid=39001.
17. Matt Buxton, The Legislature Is Ready to Sue If Dunleavy Follows Through on
Threat to Withhold K-12 Funding, THE MIDNIGHT SUN (May 28, 2019),
http://midnightsunak.com/2019/05/28/legislature-readies-lawsuit-ifdunleavy-follows-through-on-threat-to-withhold-k-12-funding/.
18. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and An Accounting at 1–
2, Alaska Legislative Council v. Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-00753 CI (Alaska Super. Ct.
July
16,
2019),
https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/alc/
complaint.pdf.
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constitutional, reasoning that the education clause’s mandate and the
legislature’s corresponding discretion outweighed other constitutional
limitations on appropriations.19 However, much of the court’s analysis
centered on other constitutional provisions, with limited and at times
implicit analysis of the education clause outside of acknowledging its
basic directive and importance. The Governor appealed the case to the
Supreme Court of Alaska on December 13, 2019.20
This Note argues that in Alaska Legislative Council v. Dunleavy, the
supreme court should shift its school funding jurisprudence to require a
thorough analysis under the education clause, which would better align
with its early public education cases. Part II explores the history of the
Alaska public school system and the shift in the supreme court’s public
education jurisprudence away from the education clause analysis. Part III
introduces and summarizes Alaska Legislative Council. Finally, Part IV
argues that school funding cases, including Alaska Legislative Council,
cannot be properly analyzed without a thorough analysis of the education
clause.

II. THE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM IN ALASKA
A.

Public Education Prior to Statehood

Prior to statehood in 1959, Alaska operated under a dual system of
public education in which schooling was provided by both the federal
government and the Territory of Alaska.21 The first public schools in
Alaska were operated by the federal government.22 The Organic Act of
1884 established these schools, providing “[t]hat the Secretary of the
Interior shall make needful and proper provision for the education of
children of school age in the Territory of Alaska.”23 The dual system
emerged with the passage of the Nelson Act in 1905, which established
new territorial schools for “white children and children of mixed blood
who lead a civilized life.”24 These schools were to be operated under the

19. See Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 6
(reasoning that the education clause did not require specific sources of revenue to
be spent in violation of the dedicated funds clause).
20. Dunleavy v. Alaska Legislative Council, No. S17666 (Alaska Dec. 13,
2019), https://appellate-records.courts.alaska.gov/CMSPublic/Case/General?
caseID=25798.
21. Barnhardt, supra note 5, at 11.
22. ALASKA DEP’T OF EDUC. AND EARLY DEV., HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF
EDUCATION HISTORY IN ALASKA 1 (2011), http://www.akleg.gov/basis/
get_documents.asp?session=27&docid=28.
23. Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 13, 23 Stat. 24, 27–28 (1884).
24. Act of Jan. 27, 1905, ch. 277, § 7, 33 Stat. 616, 619 (1905).
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supervision of the Governor of the Territory of Alaska, acting as ex officio
superintendent.25 The Nelson Act further provided that, unlike “white
children and children of mixed blood,” the education of Alaska Native
children was to be provided for by the federal government.26 The Alaska
Native Service, the Alaska Branch of the Bureau of Indian Affairs,27
operated these schools.28
Over the next several decades, attempts were made to unify the dual
system. The responsibility for the education of Alaska Native children
was to be “transferred from Federal to Territorial jurisdiction as rapidly
as conditions justif[ied].”29 However, these attempts were unsuccessful
because the territory could not financially support any additional public
schools.30 Localities did not provide significant financial support;
territorial schools were reimbursed seventy-five to eighty-five percent of
their operating costs by the territorial government.31 At the time of
statehood, the territorial government supported eighty-eight schools
while the federal government operated approximately one hundred
schools.32 Located in remote, isolated villages that lacked territorial
schools, the federally-run schools were operated by the Alaska Native
Service with the purpose of providing education to Alaska Native
children.33 The curriculum focused on “teaching beginners English and
familiarizing [Alaska Native children] with American ways of life.”34 The
Alaska Native Service also operated three boarding schools that enrolled
Alaska Native students from across the entire territory.35
B.

Development of Public Education from Statehood Onwards

The transition from territory to state required drafting a new state
constitution. One of the goals of the Alaska constitutional convention was
to adopt a unified public school system.36 In contemplating the issues of

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. JAMES P. DAVIS, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR OFFICE OF TERRITORIES, MID-CENTURY
ALASKA 55 (1952).
28. Barnhardt, supra note 5, at 11. The Bureau of Indian Affairs was preceded
by the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Education. Id.
29. Id. at 55.
30. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys., 536 P.2d 793, 800 (Alaska
1975).
31. DAVIS, supra note 27, at 58.
32. Id. at 55.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 61.
35. Id. at 62.
36. See Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys., 536 P.2d 793, 800 (Alaska
1975) (“The problem of creating a viable, unified system of public education in
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public education, the framers were cognizant that a statewide public
school system would face challenges unique to Alaska.37 Alaska is by far
the largest state in the union.38 It is also the least densely populated state.39
At 35.8%, the rural population is a significantly higher proportion of the
population than the national average of 17.4%.40 Alaska’s school
demographics reflect this difference; over half of Alaska’s 506 schools are
rural schools,41 yet these schools enroll only about one-third of all K-12
students in the state.42
With these conditions in mind, as well as the history of the dual
educational system, the members of the constitutional convention sought
to adopt a unified public school system. To this end, Alaska adopted the
education clause, which mandates that “[t]he legislature shall by general
law establish and maintain a system of public schools open to all children
of the State.”43 The Alaska Supreme Court held that the phrase “open to
all” is “a unitary phrase embodying a requirement of nonsegregated
schools” and indicates an intent to adopt a unified system of public
schooling.44 The court reasoned that the phrasing in the constitution
diverged from common phrasings of other state constitutions because the
drafters were focused on a unitary, but not uniform, public school system
due to “the unique problems in the vast rural areas of Alaska.”45
The vastness of Alaska also influenced the structure of the state’s
local government, which in turn impacted the governance of school
districts. Alaska has a unique local government structure; it is one of only
two states that is not organized into counties.46 Instead, the drafters
this state confronted the framers of our constitution when they convened in
1955.”).
37. See infra Section III.B.2.
38. Dylan Matthews, Alaska Is Big. Alaska.org Wants to Show You Exactly How
Big., VOX (Apr. 25, 2015), https://www.vox.com/2015/4/25/8492577/alaska-isvery-big.
39. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 CENSUS: POPULATION DENSITY DATA (TEXT
VERSION) (2010), https://www.census.gov/content/census/en/data/tables/
2010/dec/density-data-text.html.
40. JOHN CROMARTIE & SHAWN BUCHOLTZ, U.S. DEP’T OF ARGIC., ALASKA RURAL DEFINITIONS: STATE-LEVEL MAPS 6 (2007).
41. EMEKA EMEKAUWA, THE STAR WITH MY NAME: THE ALASKA RURAL SYSTEMIC
INITIATIVE AND THE IMPACT OF PLACE-BASED EDUCATION ON NATIVE STUDENT
ACHIEVEMENT 2 (Doris Terry Williams ed., 2004).
42. MARK GLANDER, U.S. NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, SELECTED
STATISTICS FROM THE PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION UNIVERSE:
SCHOOL YEAR 2015–16 11 (2017), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018052.pdf.
43. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
44. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys., 536 P.2d 793, 801–02 (Alaska
1975).
45. Id. at 801–03.
46. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHIC AREAS REFERENCE MANUAL: STATES,
COUNTIES, AND STATISTICALLY EQUIVALENT ENTITIES ch. 4, 2 (1994), https://

37.1 LAWS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020

THE ALASKAN VARIABLE

6/29/2020 10:18 PM

93

envisioned a new form of local government for the rural and sparselypopulated state.47 This system would allow for “local government
adaptation in a state with great variations in geographic, economic, social,
and political conditions.”48 The Alaska Constitution states that Alaska
was to be divided into organized and unorganized boroughs.49
Organized boroughs are one form of municipal government
provided by the Alaska Constitution.50 There are currently nineteen
organized boroughs, which cover forty-five percent of the land mass.51 In
areas of the state “in which social, economic, and political resources could
not yet sustain a viable system of local self-government, boroughs would
remain ‘unorganized’ and the state government would provide for their
needs directly, or through whatever local instrumentalities were deemed
appropriate.”52 State legislation has subsequently provided that all land
outside of the organized boroughs is to be incorporated into a single
unorganized borough.53 This unorganized borough cannot have a
municipal government under the state constitution. Rather, “[t]he
legislature shall provide for the performance of services it deems
necessary or advisable” in the unorganized borough.54
Cities are the second form of municipal government established by
the constitution.55 There are 144 city governments in Alaska.56 City
governments can exist within organized boroughs or the unorganized
borough.57 City governments that exist within an organized borough
government can be unified with the borough’s municipal government;
this unified government is treated as an organized borough by the state
legislature.58 The city, borough, and unified municipal governments were
designed to provide local services, including public school systems.59
Section 14.12.010 of the Alaska Statutes governs the provision of

www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/reference/GARM/Ch4GARM.pdf.
47. THOMAS A. MOREHOUSE & VICTOR FISCHER, BOROUGH GOVERNMENT IN
ALASKA: A STUDY OF STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS 5 (1971).
48. LOCAL BOUNDARY COMM’N STAFF, ALASKA DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CMTY, &
ECON. DEV., LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ALASKA 8–9 (2015), https://
www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/Portals/4/pub/2015%20%20LOCAL%20GOV
ERNMENT%20IN%20ALASKA.pdf.
49. ALASKA CONST. art. X, §§ 3, 6.
50. Id. § 2.
51. LOCAL BOUNDARY COMM’N STAFF, supra note 48, at 2.
52. MOREHOUSE & FISCHER, supra note 47, at 6.
53. ALASKA STAT. § 29.03.010 (2018).
54. ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 6.
55. LOCAL BOUNDARY COMM’N STAFF, supra note 48, at 1.
56. Id. at 1.
57. Id. at 3.
58. Id. at 4 n.1.
59. Id. at 18–19.
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public school systems.60 Under subsection (2), “each organized borough
is a borough school district.”61 Within organized boroughs, city
governments are not permitted to provide public schooling.62 There are
nineteen borough school districts in Alaska.63 In the unorganized
borough, public education is provided for by either city governments or
Regional Education Attendance Areas (REAAs), which are “state service
areas to provide public education to the unorganized borough.”64 There
are fifteen city school districts in the unorganized borough.65 The rest of
the unorganized borough is divided into nineteen REAAs.66
The majority of funding for all public schools in Alaska comes from
the state government, rather than local governments.67 Nationally, K-12
schools are funded approximately equally by the state and local
governments with forty-seven percent of nationwide K-12 funding
provided by states and forty-five percent by local governments.68 In
Alaska, the majority of public school funding, approximately sixty-five
percent, comes from the state.69 Local contributions total just twentyseven percent.70 This is for two primary reasons. First, unlike in other
states, Alaska schools were not historically provided for at the local level,
but instead were provided for by the territorial and federal
governments.71 Second, the majority of land in Alaska, approximately
ninety percent, is publicly owned.72 The federal government owns sixty
60.
61.
62.
63.

ALASKA STAT. § 14.12.010 (2018).
Id.
LOCAL BOUNDARY COMM’N STAFF, supra note 48, at 10.
CLIVE S. THOMAS ET AL., ALASKA POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE
DYNAMICS OF BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, PERSONALITIES, AND POWER 944 (2016).
64. LOCAL BOUNDARY COMM’N STAFF, supra note 48, at 13. There are three
classes of city in Alaska: home rule cities, first-class cities, and second-class cities.
Home rule and first-class cities must provide public education. Second-class cities
are not permitted to provide public education; it is provided for by REAAs or the
organized borough. Id. at 18.
65. THOMAS ET AL., supra note 63.
66. Id.
67. MATTHEW D. BERMAN ET AL., PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE PROGRAMS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA: 1998-99: ALASKA 1–3 (2001), https://nces.ed.gov/
edfin/pdf/StFinance/Alaska.pdf.
68. URBAN INST., ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION EXPENDITURES,
https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-localfinance-initiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/elementary-and-secondaryeducation-expenditures (last visited May 6, 2020).
69. LEGISLATIVE FIN. DIV., INFORMATIONAL PAPER 17-2: OPTIONS FOR REDUCING
STATE FUNDING OF ALASKA’S SCHOOLS 1 (2017).
70. Id.
71. See DAVIS, supra note 27, at 58 (discussing how appropriations for public
schools in 1952 came primarily from the territory’s budget).
72. STATE OF ALASKA, STATE HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN ch. 2, 3 (2018),
https://ready.alaska.gov/Plans/Mitigation/Documents/Alaska%20State%20M
itigation%20Plan/Ch02-AlaskasBackgroundInformation.pdf.
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percent of Alaska land.73 The state owns approximately thirty percent.74
Roughly ten percent is Native land.75 Excluding Native land, less than one
percent of land is privately owned.76 This ownership breakdown has a
significant impact on the school funding in Alaska because the Required
Local Contribution, school funding statutorily mandated from organized
borough school districts as part of the State’s school funding formula, is
set at a percentage tax based on real property value.77 In addition, REAAs,
which account for nearly half of Alaska’s school districts, cannot levy
taxes and receive all of their funding from the State.78
C.

The Public School System in the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of Alaska has heard several cases on Alaska’s
public school system. The first cases centered on the interpretation of the
education clause and the constitutional duties it imposed on the
legislature. The second line of cases pivoted more specifically to school
funding and emphasized constitutional provisions other than the
education clause.
1. Macauley v. Hildebrand
In 1971, the Supreme Court of Alaska heard its first case on public
education, Macauley v. Hildebrand.79 The dispute arose between the Juneau
School Board (School Board) and the unified City and Borough of Juneau
(Borough) as to which of the bodies had control over funds appropriated
for the operation of schools.80 The School Board sought injunctive relief
prohibiting the Borough from centralizing the accounting system for
school funds with the Borough, rather than with the School Board.81 In
rejecting this centralization, the School Board relied on a state statute that
required a borough school board consent to such centralizing of funds,
73. ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES., LAND OWNERSHIP IN ALASKA 2 (2000),
http://dnr.alaska.gov/mlw/factsht/land_fs/land_own.pdf.
74. See STATE OF ALASKA, supra note 72, at 4 (stating that the State of Alaska
owns 105 million acres of the state’s total area).
75. See id. (stating that Alaska Native Lands comprise 44 million acres of the
state’s total area).
76. ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES., supra note 73, at 2.
77. LEGISLATIVE FIN. DIV., supra note 69, at 1. The Required Local Contribution
is generally set at 2.65 mills on real property value but might be lower for some
districts. Id. Some districts are capped at forty-five percent of funding for the
preceding year due to “unusually high property values relative to population.”
Id. at 1 n.1.
78. Making the Most of Your First Term: Introduction to School Finance, ASS’N OF
ALASKA SCH. BDS., https://aasb.org/school-finance/ (last visited May 6, 2020).
79. 491 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1971).
80. Id. at 120–21.
81. Id. at 121.
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which it had not.82
Though the question presented to the court did not directly implicate
the education clause, the court’s holding turned on whether the
regulation of public school systems “was of statewide or local concern.”83
In resolving this question, the court established that the education clause
“constitutionally mandated state control over education” for three
reasons.84 First, the language—”[t]he legislature shall”—is mandatory,
rather than permissive.85 Second, the legislature is required to “maintain”
an educational system.86 Third, the obligation to provide public schooling
is given solely to the legislature.87 However, the state may still delegate
some functions to local school boards in order to “meet the varying
conditions of different localities” under the constitutional mandate of the
education clause.88 The supreme court therefore instructed that judgment
be entered for the School Board.
2. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated School Systems
The court next addressed whether the education clause requires the
legislature to provide public secondary schools in rural Alaska
communities. In Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated School Systems,89 Alaska
Natives sought to compel the State to provide secondary schools in their
communities of residence in rural western Alaska.90 None of the plaintiffs’
villages had public secondary schools, but the State provided four
alternative schooling options: (1) attendance at a state-operated regional
school, (2) attendance at a Bureau of Indian Affairs school, (3) attendance
at a non-local public secondary school through the state boarding home
program, or (4) participation in state-funded correspondence study.91 The
superior court severed the education clause claim from the rest of the suit
and awarded summary judgment to the defendants.92 The only issue
before the supreme court on appeal of the summary judgment was
whether the lack of public secondary schools in the plaintiffs’ local
communities denied them of the right to education.93
The court considered three grounds that might establish a

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
536 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1975).
Id. at 796.
Id.
Id. at 797.
Id.
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constitutional right to public education within the students’ local
communities: (1) that public school attendance is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the education clause, (2) that state Board of Education
regulations required the provision of local secondary schools, and (3) that
the denial violated the equal protection guarantees in the constitution.94
With regard to the second ground, the court held that because the state
Board of Education had repealed the regulations requiring provision of
local education and the repeal was not arbitrary, the court could not grant
relief under the former regulations.95 On the third ground, the court
declined to rule on the equal protection claim because it overlapped with
claims still pending before the superior court that similarly invoked the
equal protection clause.96
On the education clause argument, the court noted that Macauley
recognized a “dual aspect” of the education clause; it both “imposes a
duty upon the state legislature, and it confers upon Alaska school-age
children a right to education.”97 The court then examined whether this
right to education included attendance at a secondary school within one’s
home community.98 Although the purpose of the education clause was to
establish a unitary school system “designed to serve children of all racial
backgrounds,” the clause did not require that there be uniformity in such
a system.99 The court reasoned that the drafters were well aware of the
unique challenges that the state would face:
It seems likely that the drafters of the constitution had in mind
the vast expanses of Alaska, its many isolated small
communities which lack effective transportation and
communication systems, and the diverse culture and heritage of
its citizens. Since educational programs may well require special
design to confront the divergent problems presented, a
uniformity requirement in the Alaska education system might
well prove unworkable.100
The court found this consistent with its earlier observation in Macauley
that governing Alaska schools requires flexibility in order to “meet the
varying conditions of different localities.”101 Therefore, the education
clause “permits some differences in the manner of providing education,”
and the State was not required to provide secondary schools in the
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 806–07.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 799.
Id.
Id. at 801.
Id. at 803.
Id. (quoting Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 122 (Alaska 1971)).
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plaintiffs’ local communities.102 The court held that the education clause
could be fulfilled through “different types of educational opportunities
including boarding, correspondence and other programs without
requiring that all options be available to all students.”103
3. Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District v. State
The next line of education cases shifted from the provision of
education to school funding. In Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District
v. State,104 plaintiffs were a coalition consisting of the Matanuska-Susitna
Borough, the Matanuska-Susitna School District, and individual plaintiffs
challenging two Alaska public school funding laws under the state equal
protection clause.105 One statute provided state reimbursements for
boroughs and cities to recover up to seventy percent of debt incurred for
school construction.106 This provision was not applicable to REAAs.107 A
second statute provided REAAs with state grants for school construction
if they contributed two percent of project costs.108 These grants were not
available to borough and city municipal school districts.109 Plaintiffs
argued that the statutory scheme created two classes of students: those in
borough and city municipal school districts that only receive state
funding for seventy percent of school construction costs and those in
REAAs that receive state funding for ninety-eight percent of school
construction costs.110
In affirming the superior court’s ruling that there was no equal
protection violation, the supreme court examined the State’s purpose in
enacting the statutes.111 It reasoned that the State had a legitimate purpose
in the funding programs: “to assure an equitable level of educational
opportunities for those in attendance in the public schools of the state.”112
Under the Alaska Constitution, REAAs may not levy taxes.113 The
statutory scheme offset this “difference[] in constitutional status between
REAAs and borough and city school districts.”114 The legislature is given
significant discretion in determining means by which to promote public

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 804.
Id. at 803.
931 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1997).
Id. at 394.
Id. at 395.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 396.
Id.
Id. at 396–97.
Id. at 399.
Id. (citing ALASKA CONST. art X, § 2).
Id. at 400.
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policy objectives.115 Additionally, in cases of school funding, the
legislature is “acting in furtherance of its constitutionally mandated duty
to maintain and control a statewide system of public schools,” which adds
weight to the legitimacy of the state purpose.116 Therefore, the court held
the statutory scheme for funding school construction constitutional under
the state equal protection clause.117
4. State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough
In the most recent public education case, State v. Ketchikan Gateway
Borough,118 the court affirmed the constitutionality of the statutorilymandated Required Local Contribution (RLC), local money required of
organized boroughs to support their school districts as part of the State’s
school funding formula.119 The plaintiffs were individual taxpayers and
the Ketchikan Gateway Borough (“Borough”), an organized borough
required to annually pay the RLC.120 The Borough paid the RLC under
protest and filed a suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute
was unconstitutional, injunctive relief enjoining the State from
compelling compliance, and compensatory damages for the amount
paid.121 The Borough argued that because of the RLC, the state
underfunded the Borough, forcing it and the taxpayers to make up the
difference.122
Plaintiffs alleged that the RLC was unconstitutional on three bases:
(1) it violated article IX, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution (“dedicated
funds clause”) by impermissibly dedicating a state tax for a particular
purpose, (2) it exceeded the appropriations power of the state legislature
because it is paid directly to the municipal district instead of the state
treasury, and (3) it impeded the Governor’s veto power because in
circumventing the state treasury it bypasses the Governor’s potential
veto.123 The superior court granted the Borough’s motion for summary
judgment on the first claim, ruling that the RLC was unconstitutional
under the dedicated funds clause, but denied Plaintiffs’ motion on the
other two claims.124
115. Id. at 402.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 366 P.3d 86 (Alaska 2016).
119. Id. at 87.
120. Complaint at 1, State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d 86 (Alaska
2016) (No. 1KE-14-16 Civil), https://www.kgbak.us/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/
Item/357.
121. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d at 89.
122. Complaint, supra note 120, at 8.
123. Id. at 9–10. The RLC payment “never enters the state treasury, and it is
never subject to appropriations bills.” Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d at 101.
124. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d at 89.
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The supreme court reviewed all three arguments and reversed the
superior court.125 The court held that the RLC did not violate the
dedicated funds clause, noting the historical practice of local communities
sharing some responsibility for funding schools dating back prior to
statehood.126 The drafters did not intend to alter this practice, as
demonstrated by subsequent legislation which established a framework
of joint state and local public school funding.127 The court differentiated
this case from its dedicated funds clause jurisprudence, noting that the
dedicated funds clause had not been considered in a school funding
context.128 It further dismissed the claims under the appropriations clause
and the governor’s veto clause, finding no issue under either.129
In two concurring opinions, Chief Justice Stowers and Justice
Winfree noted that the court limited its holding to the dedicated funds
clause and declined to analyze the statute in the context of the education
clause.130 Both justices asserted that the constitutionality of the school
funding regulation could not be decided without reviewing the education
clause.131 Justice Winfree conducted a cursory analysis of the case under
the education clause and expressed doubt as to the constitutionality of the
RLC, but noted that the issue was purposefully not briefed and therefore
left the question open for future consideration.132

III. ALASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL V. DUNLEAVY
A.

Factual Background

At issue in Alaska Legislative Council v. Dunleavy133 was House Bill 287
(“HB 287”), “[a]n Act making appropriations for public education and
transportation of students.”134 The bill was introduced to the House
Finance Committee in January 2018 by Representative Paul Seaton, who
explained that the idea for the proposed legislation came from a meeting
of school superintendents.135 The superintendents expressed concerns
about retaining quality teachers because the misalignment between the

125. Id. at 90.
126. Id. at 91–102.
127. Id. at 96.
128. Id. at 98–102.
129. Id. at 101–02.
130. Id. at 102 (Stowers, C.J., concurring); id. (Winfree, J., concurring).
131. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d at 102 (Winfree, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 103–05.
133. Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14.
134. Id. at 1.
135. ALASKA H. FIN. COMM., MINUTES, 30th Leg. (Jan. 25, 2018) (statement of
Representative Paul Seaton at 9:04:12 AM).
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academic and financial years had been exacerbated by delays in the
legislature passing the state operating budget.136 The bill forward funded
K-12 schools for the following fiscal year.137 This funding was intended to
eliminate uncertainty created by the misalignment of the school and fiscal
years and prevent unnecessary teacher layoffs.138 Initial justification for
the bill included compliance with the constitutional requirements for the
provision of public education.139
After several months of amendments and discussions, both houses
of the state legislature passed HB 287 and transmitted the bill to thenGovernor Bill Walker.140 Governor Walker signed the bill into law on May
5, 2018.141 The bill was to take effect on July 1, 2019, and “appropriate[d]
full funding for public school districts in the state and for transportation
of students, as well as one-time additional money for public schools, for
the fiscal year 2020.”142
At the end of 2018, Mike Dunleavy was elected governor after
incumbent Bill Walker dropped out of the gubernatorial race.143 One of
the key issues in Dunleavy’s platform was “fully funding” Alaska
residents’ Permanent Fund Dividend, the annual payments made to each
resident from the State’s oil revenue.144 Governor Walker had reduced the
dividend after oil prices plummeted in 2015.145 Upon entering office,
Governor-elect Dunleavy proposed a budget that would cut spending by
$650 million to decrease the state deficit and fulfill his campaign promise
to fully fund the Permanent Fund Dividend.146 This proposal sparked a
136. Id.
137. Act of May 3, 2018, 2018 Alaska Sess. Laws. ch. 6.
138. LIEBELT, supra note 16, at 2. While the bill was first proposed to be funded
by the Constitutional Budget Reserve and the Statutory Budget Reserve Fund, id.
at 4, the final version was funded through appropriations from the general fund.
Act of May 3, 2018, 2018 Alaska Sess. Laws. ch. 6.
139. ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 30th Leg. (Jan. 25, 2018) (statement of
Arnold Liebelt, Staff, Representative Paul Seaton at 9:11:03 AM).
140. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 30th Leg., 2d Sess. 2707 (Apr. 14, 2018); ALASKA H.
JOURNAL, 30th Leg., 2d Sess. 3360, 3506 (Apr. 14, 2018). The bill was transmitted as
Senate CS for House Bill No. 287(FIN). ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 30th Leg., 2d Sess.
3506 (Apr. 14, 2018).
141. ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 30th Leg., 2d Sess. 3571 (May 4, 2018).
142. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and An Accounting,
supra note 18, at 3.
143. Dylan Scott, Mike Dunleavy Elected Governor of Alaska: Rare 2018 Pickup for
Republicans, VOX (Nov. 7, 2018, 2:14 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/11/7/18055506/midterm-election-results-alaska-governor-mikedunleavy-winner.
144. Tim Bradner, Post-Election PFD Discussion, ALASKANOMICS (Nov. 19, 2018),
https://www.alaskanomics.com/2018/11/post-election-pfd-discussion.html.
145. Id.
146. James Brooks, Governor Launches Plan to Deeply Cut Alaska State Spending,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.adn.com/politics/2019/
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budget crisis in Alaska.147 The Governor and legislature clashed over the
budget and the Governor’s proposed cuts.148 Governor Dunleavy
continued to slash the budget to fulfill campaign promises.149 The
legislature fought back by proposing its own operating budget150 and
reversing many of the Governor’s line-item vetoes.151
In the midst of this budgetary back-and-forth, Governor Dunleavy
took aim at the HB 287 appropriations.152 He announced that the State
would not distribute the funds to local school districts and justified this
withholding by stating that he viewed the funding as an illegal
appropriation.153 The legislature insisted that the appropriations were
enacted legally and must be paid.154 On June 13, 2019, the Alaska
Legislative Council, a permanent committee of the state legislature,
unanimously voted to “seek relief from the court that [the HB 287] funds
be disbursed to school districts as intended by the Legislature.”155
B.

Parties

Plaintiff was the Alaska Legislative Council (“Plaintiff”).156 Plaintiff
brought suit against Governor Mike Dunleavy in his official capacity and
also named the Commissioner of Administration for the State of Alaska
and the Commissioner of Education and Early Development of the State
02/13/gov-dunleavy-launches-massive-budget-cut-plan/.
147. Henry Olson, Alaska Shows Why Budget-Cutting Conservatives Are Destined
to Fail, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2019/08/19/alaska-shows-why-budget-cutting-conservatives-aredestined-fail/.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Andrew Kitchenman, ‘It Won’t Be Easy’: Universities, Medicaid Hit
Hard as Dunleavy Vetoes Nearly $400 Million from Budget, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (July
1,
2019),
https://www.alaskapublic.org/2019/07/01/it-wont-be-easyuniversities-medicaid-hit-hard-as-dunleavy-vetoes-nearly-400-million-frombudget/ (describing budget cuts made by Governor Dunleavy in furtherance of
campaign promises).
150. Olson, supra note 147.
151. ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 31st Leg., 1st Sess. 1367 (October 23, 2019). The House
budget was transmitted to the Governor on August 7, 2019 and signed into law
on August 17, 2019. Id. at 1367, 1373.
152. James Brooks, Governor Threatens No School Funding after July 1, Escalating
Fight with Alaska Legislature, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (May 21, 2019),
https://www.adn.com/politics/alaska-legislature/2019/05/22/governorvows-no-school-funding-after-july-1-escalating-fight-with-alaska-legislature/.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. ALASKA LEGIS. COUNCIL MINUTES, 31st Leg. (June 13, 2019) (statement of
Megan Wallace, Director, Legal Services, Legislative Affairs Agency at 4:00:10
PM).
156. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and An Accounting,
supra note 18, at 1.
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of Alaska as co-defendants (“Defendants”).157 The Coalition for Education
Equity, Inc. (CEE), a non-profit based in Anchorage that promotes “a
quality, equitable and adequate public education for every Alaska child
through advocacy, policy development and legal action,” moved to
intervene.158 The court granted leave for CEE to intervene on the
consequences for education funding should Defendants prevail, but
prohibited the organization from litigating the Alaska Constitution’s
requirements for state funded education, justifying this limitation on the
basis of the issue’s magnitude and complexity.159
C.

Claims

Plaintiff brought suit to compel the disbursement of the funding
provided for in HB 287.160 It presented three claims for the disbursement
of the funds all provided for by HB 287: (1) funding for public schools, (2)
funding for the transportation of students, and (3) a one-time grant to the
Department of Education and Early Development.161 Under each claim,
Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the failure
to distribute the funds appropriated under HB 287 prevented the
legislature from meeting its constitutional obligations under the
education clause.162
D.

Procedural Posture

The Alaska Legislative Council brought suit in the Superior Court
for the State of Alaska, First Judicial District at Juneau on July 16, 2019.163
Because the parties agreed that the issues were legal questions not
157. Id. at 2.
158. Order re: Motion to Intervene at 1, Alaska Legislative Council v.
Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-00753 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. filed July 16, 2019),
https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/alc/order.pdf; Who We Are,
COALITION FOR EDUCATION EQUALITY, https://ceequity.org/about (last visited
May 6, 2020). CEE has been a party to key impact litigation in Alaska public school
cases over the last two decades. See Legal History, COALITION FOR EDUCATION
EQUALITY, https://ceequity.org/legal-history (describing the Coalition for
Education Equality’s involvement in cases dating back to 1997) (last visited May,
6, 2020).
159. Order re: Motion to Intervene, supra note 158, at 7.
160. Teagan Hanlon, Alaska Legislature Sues Gov. Dunleavy Over Public School
Funding, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (July 16, 2019), https://www.adn.com/
politics/alaska-legislature/2019/07/16/alaska-legislature-sues-gov-dunleavyover-public-school-funding/.
161. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and An Accounting,
supra note 18, at 4–7.
162. Id. at 4–7.
163. Id. at 9.
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requiring discovery, the court approved an expedited schedule for filing
cross-motions for summary judgment and simultaneous answering
briefs.164 The court then granted CEE leave to join the suit as PlaintiffIntervenors,165 and for twenty state legislators in their individual
capacities to file an amicus brief in support of Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment.166 On October 4, 2019, the court heard oral argument
on the cross-motions for summary judgment.167 The court granted
Plaintiff’s and CEE’s motions for summary judgment and denied
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.168 Defendants appealed to
the Alaska Supreme Court on December 13, 2019.169
E.

Parties’ Arguments

1. The Defendants’ Theory of the Case
In Defendants’ view, the Alaska Constitution sets up an “annual
budgeting model” with roles for both the executive and legislative
branches.170 This can purportedly be seen in the interplay between several
provisions of the constitution, mainly found in article IX.171 First,
Defendants highlighted that the HB 287 funds violate the dedicated funds
clause, which provides that “the proceeds of any state tax or license shall
not be dedicated to any special purpose.”172 They then relied on a suite of
additional article IX finance and taxation provisions to argue that there is
an annual appropriations model that requires the budgeting process be
conducted no more than one financial year prior.173 Under this model, the
164. Order re: Joint Motion for Scheduling, Alaska Legislative Council v.
Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-00753 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2019),
https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/alc/scheduling-order.pdf.
165. Order re: Motion to Intervene, supra note 158, at 7.
166. Order re: Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amici Curiae, Alaska
Legislative Council v. Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-00753 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. filed July
16, 2019), https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/alc/order2.pdf.
167. Order Scheduling Oral Argument, Alaska Legislative Council v.
Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-0073 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2019), https://
public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/alc/oral-argument.pdf.
168. Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 10.
169. Dunleavy v. Alaska Legislative Council, No. S17666 (Alaska filed
December 13, 2019) (Alaska App. Ct. Case Mgmt. Sys.), https://appellaterecords.courts.alaska.gov/CMSPublic/Case/General?caseID=25798.
170. Defendants’ Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 2–3, Alaska
Legislative Council v. Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-00753 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. filed July
16, 2019), https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/alc/defendantsopposition.pdf.
171. Id. at 5.
172. Id. at 3–5 (quoting ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 7).
173. Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 7.
Defendants argued that this was achieved through a combination of four
provisions of article IX. Section 8 “generally prohibits the State from contracting
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legislature cannot pass appropriations earlier than the preceding fiscal
year, and HB 287 would therefore violate this ban on forward funding.174
Defendants argued that the interaction of these article IX provisions sets
up an annual appropriations model that requires the budgeting process
to be conducted no more than one financial year prior.175 Under this
model, the legislature cannot pass appropriations earlier than the
preceding fiscal year, and HB 287 would therefore violate this ban on
forward funding.176
Defendants invoked article II, section 15 (“governor’s veto clause”),
which grants the governor veto power.177 The governor’s veto clause
specifically provides that the governor “may, by veto, strike or reduce
items in appropriation bills.”178 Defendants also argued this forward
funding not only subverts the governor’s veto clause, but also the
legislative process by effectively requiring super-majority voting to enact
budgets.179 Defendants asserted that the education clause is not
implicated in this case because “education funding does not enjoy a
unique status” and is not exempt from the above provisions of the Alaska
Constitution.180 Defendants further asserted that public policy concerns
have no bearing on the constitutionality of forward funding and that
Governor Dunleavy had no constitutional obligation to implement an
unconstitutional statute.181

state debt.” Id. Section 10 “permits the State to borrow money to fulfill
appropriations for any fiscal year in anticipation of the collection of revenues for
that same year, ‘but all debt so contracted shall be paid before the end of the next
fiscal year.’” Id. Section 12 requires the governor to submit to the legislature “a
budget for the next fiscal year setting forth all proposed expenditures and
anticipated income of all departments, offices, and agencies of the State . . . [as
well as] a general appropriation bill to authorize the proposed expenditures.” Id.
Section 17(d) requires that money still available for appropriation “at the end of a
fiscal year be deposited in the constitutional budget reserve fund until any prior
appropriation from that fund is repaid.” Id.
174. Id. at 6–7.
175. Id. at 9 (“[T]he appropriations subvert the governor’s veto power and the
legislature’s power of appropriation because if they are upheld, nothing would
prevent a politically aligned legislature and governor from passing budgets for
many years into the future knowing that so long as future legislature and
governors were not similar in agreement the original budget decisions would
stick.”).
176. Defendants’ Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note
170, at 1–2.
177. Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 9
(quoting ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 15).
178. ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 15.
179. Defendants’ Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note
170, at 8.
180. Id. at 9.
181. Id. at 20, 24.
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2. The Plaintiff’s and Intervenor’s Theories of the Case
Plaintiff and CEE relied primarily on three provisions of the state
constitution to support HB 287’s legality: the education clause, article IX,
section 13 (“appropriations clause”), and article III, section 16 (“faithful
execution clause”).182 Plaintiff proposed a theory of the case that
integrates the education clause into the constitutional analysis of the
relationship between the executive and legislative branches regarding
appropriations and budgeting.183 Plaintiff argued that because it is
constitutionally required to fund the public school system, any analysis
of that funding must include a holistic review of the constitution,
including the education clause.184 Further, Plaintiff read the constitution
to be silent as to the direct issue of forward funding, but viewed the
practice as consistent with the process of appropriations outlined in the
appropriations clause.185 Plaintiff alleged that the constitution does not
prohibit forward funding nor limit the legislature’s appropriations
powers, and that forward funding would be consistent with the annual
budgeting model proposed by Defendants.186
CEE had a similar theory of the case, agreeing that the education
clause was highly relevant.187 It saw no separation of powers concerns
implicated, nor did it view the public school appropriations as violating
the dedicated funds clause.188 CEE also addressed prudential concerns

182. See Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 3, 9
(asserting the constitutionality of the appropriation under the education clause,
and arguing that the governor’s conduct violated the appropriations clause and
faithful execution clause); see also Complaint in Intervention, Alaska Legislative
Council v. Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-00753 CI (Alaska Super. filed July 16, 2019),
https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/alc/complaintintervention.pdf (alleging that the governor failed his constitutional duty under
the education clause, the appropriations clause, and the faithful execution clause).
The appropriations clause states in part that “[n]o money shall be withdrawn from
the treasury expect in accordance with appropriations made by law.” ALASKA
CONST. art. IX, § 13. The faithful execution clause requires the governor faithfully
execute the laws of Alaska. ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 16.
183. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at
3–6, Alaska Legislative Council v. Dunleavy, No. 1JU-19-00753 CI (Alaska Super.
Ct. filed July 16, 2019), https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/
alc/plaintiffs-opposition.pdf.
184. Id. at 4.
185. Id. at 9–10.
186. Id. at 7, 11.
187. Coalition for Education Equity’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment at 14, Alaska Legislative Council v. Dunleavy, No. 1JU-1900753 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. July 16, 2019), https://public.courts.alaska.gov/
web/media/docs/alc/coalition-opposition.pdf. CEE dedicated a section of its
brief, titled “The Education Clause is Patently Relevant to this Case,” to discussing
the education clause’s relevance. Id.
188. Id. at 4–13.
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about public school funding, including the possibility of a gap in time
between a ruling for the Governor and passage of a new appropriations
bill, during which Alaska’s public schools would go unfunded.189
F.

Superior Court’s Order

The court found for Plaintiff and CEE, ruling that Defendants have
“a constitutional obligation to execute the appropriations in [HB 287]”
and that withholding the funds “infringes upon the legislature’s power of
appropriation and duty to fund public education under the . . . Education
Clause.”190 The court did not frame the question in terms of the education
clause, but instead presented it as solely implicating the annual
appropriations model.191 The court began its analysis by noting that the
legislature may enact appropriations for a public purpose that is rational
and valid.192 The parties did not dispute that the appropriations were
rational and valid because the legislature had the valid purpose of
maintaining public education.193 Thus, the parties presumed the
appropriations did not violate the education clause.
The court rejected Defendants’ arguments that the appropriations
were nonetheless unconstitutional under either the dedicated funds
clause or the annual appropriations model, finding that the HB 287
funding was not a direct violation of the dedicated funds clause as it did
not “earmark a particular public revenue source.”194 While the dedicated
funds clause prohibits the earmarking of a state tax or license for a
particular purpose, it is “intended to allow necessary dedication of funds
once they . . . [are] received and placed in the general fund.”195 The
appropriations for the HB 287 funding were from the general fund and
did not violate the dedicated funds clause.196
The court also rejected Defendants’ argument that the
appropriations violated the annual appropriations model. It found that
the constitutional provisions cited by Defendants at most demonstrated
an aspirational model that does not outweigh the appropriations’
presumed constitutionality.197 Even if this annual appropriations model
was constitutionally mandated, HB 287 would not violate that mandate
because the bill had gone through the appropriations process in 2018, was
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 16–19.
Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 9–10.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5–8.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 7.
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subject to the veto of the sitting governor, and was subject to repeal by the
legislature in the 2019 session.198 Therefore, the aspiration of an annual
appropriations model was outweighed by the legislature’s
appropriations clause power and the duty to provide public education
under the education clause.199 Because forward funding was therefore
lawfully enacted, the court ruled that Governor Dunleavy had a
constitutional obligation to execute the appropriations under the faithful
execution clause and refusal to do so would infringe upon the
legislature’s appropriations power and constitutional duty to provide
public education.200

IV. THE EDUCATION CLAUSE IN ALASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL V.
DUNLEAVY AND BEYOND
Alaska Legislative Council is the latest in a line of school funding cases
in which the court upheld a school funding statutory scheme despite
underweighting the education clause in its analysis. The court has
primarily reviewed these funding schemes through other constitutional
provisions including the state equal protection clause, dedicated funds
clause, appropriations clause, and governor’s veto clause.201 Here, the
superior court followed the supreme court’s lead by analyzing the
forward funding provisions under the dedicated funds clause.202 In
deciding the pending appeal, the supreme court could establish a more
principled jurisprudence by giving appropriate weight to the education
clause, which grants the state legislature broad discretion in actions taken
in furtherance of the provision of public schooling.203 In giving equal
constitutional weight to the education clause, the court should adopt a
presumption of constitutionality for school funding schemes. If the court
takes this approach in Alaska Legislative Council, the forward funding of
public schools by the legislature would be constitutional under the
education clause.

198. Id. at 7–8.
199. Id. at 8.
200. Id. at 9–10.
201. See supra Sections II.C.3, II.C.4.
202. Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 6.
203. See Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 122 (Alaska 1971) (noting the
“constitutionally mandated state control over education”).
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As Public Education Cases, School Funding Cases Should Be
Decided in the Context of the Education Clause

Public schooling cases are analyzed in light of the legislature’s
constitutional duty to “establish and maintain a system of public schools
open to all children of the State.”204 The supreme court has long held that
the education clause “not only requires that the legislature ‘establish’ a
school system, but also gives to that body the continuing obligation to
‘maintain’ the system.”205 Because public school systems require continual
funding, school funding cases are a subset of public education cases and
are properly decided under the education clause.
Despite the constitutional obligation to maintain public schools
through adequate funding, the supreme court avoided deciding the two
school funding cases it has heard, Matanuska-Susitna and Ketchikan, under
the education clause.206 The two concurrences in Ketchikan noted this
omission, remarking that the majority erred in not adequately
considering the education clause.207 Avoidance of the education clause
may be a strategic move on the part of litigants. In his concurrence in
Ketchikan, Chief Justice Stowers noted that “the parties intentionally did
not litigate this question [of education clause analysis].”208 Despite
pressure from several justices during oral arguments, the parties insisted
that the education clause was not at issue in the case.209 The parties’
avoidance of the education clause may have pushed the supreme court to
decide the issue on other constitutional grounds.210 However, such
strategic avoidance should not limit the court’s complete constitutional
analysis. The court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the RLC not
under the education clause, but the dedicated funds clause, relying
heavily on a history of state and local cooperation in providing public
schools.211 However, Justice Winfree noted that the RLC appeared to be
204. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
205. Macauley, 491 P.2d at 122 (emphasis added).
206. See supra Sections II.C.3, II.C.4.
207. See State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d 86, 102 (Alaska 2016)
(Stowers, C.J., concurring); id. (Winfree, J., concurring); see also supra Section II.C.4.
208. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d at 102.
209. See id. (noting that, despite questions from the justices during oral
arguments, the parties insisted that the education clause was not implicated).
210. See id. (“I am concerned that the court was not given the opportunity to
decide the dedicated funds question controlled by article IX, section 7 of the
Alaska Constitution . . . in the fuller context of the public schools clause . . . .”); see
also id. at 105 (Winfree, J., concurring) (noting doubt that RLC is constitutional
under the education clause, but resolving doubt in favor of constitutionality since
the issue was not litigated or briefed on appeal).
211. See id. at 91 (majority opinion) (holding that “the required local
contribution is not a ‘state tax or license’ within the meaning of the dedicated
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an unconstitutional dedicated tax.212 Given Justice Winfree’s analysis of
the RLC, this tension between the education clause and the dedicated
funds clause is better resolved with a more thorough analysis of the
education clause. If the court applied the education clause, then the RLC
would be presumed constitutional while the party challenging it would
have the burden of persuasion.213 Unlike the supreme court in Ketchikan,
the superior court in Alaska Legislative Council noted that the funding was
enacted “in furtherance of fulfilling the legislature’s mandate to maintain
a system of public education under the [education clause].”214 The court
adopted a presumption of constitutionality and placed the burden of
persuasion with Defendants, though not explicitly under the education
clause.215
B.

The Alaska Constitution Grants the Legislature Broad Discretion
Under the Education Clause

In conducting an education clause analysis, the court should grant
the legislature broad discretion in its actions undertaken to fulfill the
duties to “establish and maintain a system of public schools.”216
Extending this broad legislative discretion to school funding cases is
supported by: (1) the plain text of the education clause, (2) the intent of
the drafters as expressed at the constitutional convention, (3) prudential
concerns specific to public education in Alaska, and (4) implications of
supreme court precedent.
1.

The Text of the Education Clause Dictates Broad Legislative
Discretion
The “analysis of a constitutional provision begins with, and remains
grounded in, the words of the provision itself.”217 Under the education
clause, “[t]he legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a
system of public schools open to all children of the State.”218 The court
noted several textual reasons for “pervasive state authority”: the
language is mandatory rather than permissive, the obligation includes the
continuing duty to maintain a public school system, and the legislature is
funds clause.”)
212. Id. at 103 (Winfree, J., concurring).
213. Id. at 102.
214. Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 5.
215. See id. at 3 (“Because the Defendants are raising a constitutional challenge
to the [HB 287] appropriations, they bear the burden to overcome the presumption
of the statute’s constitutionality.”).
216. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
217. Hickel v. Cowper, 874 P.2d 922, 927 (Alaska 1994).
218. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
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the sole body of government that is tasked with this duty.219 Courts have
subsequently interpreted this duty to maintain to include an obligation to
fund schools.220
2. The Intent of the Drafters Dictates Broad Legislative Discretion
The court has noted that, “[w]hile prior practice and the framers’
purposes are not necessarily conclusive, an historical perspective is
essential to an enlightened contemporary interpretation of . . . [the]
constitution.”221 Contrary to the court’s holding in Ketchikan, which relied
on a history of local involvement in the provision of schooling, the court
in Hootch noted that prior to statehood, Alaska operated under a dual
system of public education provided by the federal government, through
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the territorial government.222 Through
the education clause, the drafters aimed to address the unique issues in
creating a unified public school system in Alaska.223 Granting broad
power to the legislature was purposeful; the drafters explicitly shifted
from broadly directing that the state provide public education to directing
that the state legislature be the “particular division of the state
government . . . . that should make the provisions [for a public education
system].”224 Delegate Armstrong spoke further to the intent of the
Committee on Health, Education, and Welfare to grant broad powers to
the legislature under the education clause:
[I]n Section 1 . . . the Committee has kept a broad concept and
has tried to keep our schools unshackled by constitutional road
blocks. May I draw to your attention further the fact that we
have used the words [“]to establish and maintain by general
law”. This is a clear directive to the legislature to set the
machinery in motion in keeping with the constitution and
whatever future needs may arise.225
While the intentions of the constitutional drafters on their own do
not dictate the interpretation of the education clause, the clear intent to
grant the legislature broad power to maintain the public education system
weighs in favor of the existence of such a power.

219. Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 122 (Alaska 1971).
220. See supra Section IV.A.
221. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys., 536 P.2d 793, 800 (Alaska 1975)
(footnote omitted).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. 5 MINUTES OF THE DAILY PROCEEDINGS, ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 1955–56, at 3312 (1965) (statement of Del. Hurley).
225. Id. vol. 2, at 1514 (statement of Del. Armstrong).
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3. Prudential Reasons Dictate Broad Legislative Discretion
Broad legislative discretion under the education clause reflects “the
responsiveness of the constitutional convention to the unique problems
in the vast rural areas of Alaska.”226 Alaska is the only state that is not
divided into municipal governments with autonomy in providing local
services.227 The state legislature is left to fill the gaps created by the unique
governmental structure of Alaska, and without broad legislative
discretion over the public school system, provision of services in more
rural areas could suffer.
Broad legislative discretion also reflects the importance of funding
to the management of public education in Alaska. Compared to most of
the country,228 Alaska’s state legislature plays a much greater role in
funding the state’s public schools, contributing approximately two-thirds
of the funding.229 This difference is because the history of public education
in Alaska diverges substantially from that of other states.230 In general,
there is a “persistence of attachment to government at the lowest level
where education is concerned.”231 In Alaska, the oversight of public
education initially fell under the purview of the federal government,
rather than local communities.232 There is less of a historical basis for a
system that “permits and encourages a large measure of participation in
and control of each district’s schools at the local level”233 in a state where
public education has never been provided for locally. This history and
current practice of more centralized control and funding of schools weigh
in favor of greater legislative discretion in school funding so as to more
accurately reflect the unique funding structure that relies on state

226. See Hootch, 536 P.2d at 803 (discussing how the education clause does not
require uniformity and appears to contemplate various forms of education
depending on a diverse array of circumstances).
227. John Havelock, Alaska Needs to Finish the Job of Creating Boroughs,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.adn.com/commentary/
article/alaska-needs-finish-job-creating-boroughs/2014/11/25/ (updated June
29, 2016).
228. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45827, STATE AND LOCAL FINANCING OF PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (2019). Nationwide, state funding accounts for under fifty percent of
public school revenues. Id. at 2.
229. BERMAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 2, 4.
230. Barnhardt, supra note 5, at 2.
231. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49 (1973).
232. See Barnhardt, supra note 5, at 11. In 1884, the Organic Act established a
civil government in Alaska and directed the federal government to provide for
education in Alaska. Id. Very little has been written about traditional approaches
to teaching and learning among Alaska Native people. See id. at 1 (“I am always
reminded of the scarcity of published information on the history of education in
Alaska in general, and in particular, on the history of schooling for Alaska Native
people.”).
233. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49.
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funding.
4. Supreme Court Precedent Dictates Broad Legislative Discretion
The supreme court has explicitly and implicitly recognized broad
legislative discretion under the education clause in its jurisprudence. In
its first analysis of the education clause, the court held that there was a
“constitutional mandate for pervasive state authority in the field of
education.”234 This interpretation has been reinforced by the court’s
deference to the legislature when evaluating the legislature’s ability to
provide schools in remote rural communities.235 The court has also
implicitly recognized a broad deference to the legislature to fulfill its
education clause duties through school funding. Though it did not rely
on the education clause, the court has upheld various school funding
provisions on a number of different constitutional grounds.236 The
common denominator in the school funding cases is that the court
recognized that the legislature has taken action “[t]o fulfill this
constitutional mandate [under the education clause].”237
C.

The Education Clause Mandates Funding for Public Schools

In recent decades, lower courts have consistently acknowledged that
the education clause creates a constitutional mandate to fund public
schooling. In two notable cases, the superior court ruled that, under the
challenged funding systems, the legislature had not met its duty under
the education clause and found for the plaintiffs before the cases were
ultimately settled out of court.238 In Kasayulie v. State,239 plaintiffs alleged
that funding for school facilities was racially discriminatory.240 In Moore
v. State,241 plaintiffs alleged violation of the education clause by “failing
‘consistently and repeatedly to adequately fund’ . . . constitutionally
mandated education.”242 The court explicitly ruled that the duty to

234. Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 122 (Alaska 1971).
235. See supra Section II.C.2.
236. See supra Sections II.C.3, II.C.4.
237. State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d 86, 88 (Alaska 2016); see
also Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391, 399 (Alaska 1997)
(“By enacting a law to ensure equitable educational opportunities across the state,
the legislature acted in furtherance of this constitutional mandate [under the
education clause].”).
238. EDUC. LAW CENTER, STATE PROFILE: ALASKA, https://edlawcenter.org/
states/alaska.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2020).
239. Kasayulie v. State, No. 3AN-97-3782CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2011).
240. EDUC. LAW CENTER supra note 238.
241. No. 3AN-04-9756 Civil, 2007 WL 8310251 (Alaska Super. Ct. June 21,
2007).
242. Id. at *1 (quoting Second Amended Complaint at 2, No. 3AN-04-9756
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maintain the public school system under the education clause includes an
obligation to provide funding adequate to accord to schools a certain
standard of instruction.243
In Alaska Legislative Council, CEE brought a claim in intervention
under the education clause that the superior court disallowed.244 The
court was concerned with the “enormity and complexity of the issue”
given the expedited timeline that had already been approved.245
However, the superior court proceeded to note in its decision that “[t]he
Alaska Supreme Court has explained that the statutory structure for
funding public education in Alaska is established pursuant to the
legislature’s mandate and responsibility to maintain a system of public
education under the Public Education Clause.”246
D.

The Supreme Court Should Decide Future School Funding Cases
Under the Education Clause

If the school funding cases are analyzed with proper weight to the
legislature’s broad discretion to fulfill its constitutional mandate under
the education clause, the court should adopt a presumption of
constitutionality for school funding schemes employed in furtherance of
the legislature’s education clause duties. In cases of intra-constitutional
conflict regarding school funding, the court should give due weight to its
education clause analysis.
1.

In Reconciling Intra-Constitutional Conflicts, School Funding
Schemes Should Be Analyzed Explicitly Through the Education
Clause
In questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation, the court
“adopt[s] the ‘rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent,
reason, and policy.’”247 The text of the education clause, intent of the
constitutional drafters, policy concerns, and precedent all support an
interpretation of the education clause granting the legislature broad
discretion in its actions to fulfill its constitutional duties to provide a
unitary public school system for Alaska.248 If school funding cases are
analyzed in light of this interpretation, the court’s analysis should include
Civil, 2007 WL 8310251).
243. Id. at *76.
244. Order re: Motion to Intervene, supra note 158, at 3–4, 7.
245. Id. at 7.
246. Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 5 (citing
State v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d 86, 87–88 (Alaska 2016)).
247. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 366 P.3d at 90 (quoting Se. Alaska
Conservation Council v. State, 202 P.3d 1162, 1167 (Alaska 2009)).
248. See supra Section IV.B.
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a presumption of constitutionality for statutory school funding schemes
based on the constitutional mandate to provide adequate funding to
“maintain a system of public schools.”249
Under this presumption, the party challenging the funding scheme
should have the burden to show either that an education clause analysis
is inappropriate because the legislature’s actions were not taken pursuant
to its education clause duties or that the constitutional mandate to
establish and maintain public schools is outweighed by other
constitutional concerns. This is the analysis hinted at by the superior court
in Alaska Legislative Council, which weighed factors against a presumption
of constitutionality of forward funding under the legislature’s education
clause mandate.250 This presumption departed from the reasoning in the
supreme court’s school funding cases, in which the court declined to
conduct such a direct analysis under the education clause.251
This presumption of constitutionality realigns the supreme court’s
school funding jurisprudence with early public schooling cases, which
focused heavily on the legislature’s duties under the education clause.252
The court’s reasoning in early public schooling cases, while implicating
other constitutional provisions, ultimately turned on the legislature’s
duty under the education clause.253 For example, in Macauley, the court
found that the Alaska Constitution grants municipalities broad
governmental powers in local activities.254 However, the court held that
“[t]he outcome of the local activity test in the case at bar is dictated by [the
education clause].”255 In its thorough analysis of the education clause, the
court in Macauley held that the “constitutional mandate for pervasive state
authority in the field of education could not be more clear.”256 Under this
reading of the education clause, the court deferred to the legislature to act
as it “has seen fit” in the practicalities of the public school system.257

249. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
250. See Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 6–8
(finding no violation of the dedicated funds clause or annual appropriation
model, but noting even if appropriations “undermine[d the] spirit” of the annual
appropriation model, it would be outweighed by the legislature’s appropriation
powers and duty under the education clause, an approach consistent with
precedent weighing “competing values” in determining whether an
appropriation indirectly violated the dedicated funds clause (citing Myers v.
Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 68 P.3d 386, 391–94 (Alaska 2003)).
251. See supra Sections II.C.3, II.C.4.
252. See supra Sections II.C.1, II.C.2.
253. See supra Sections II.C.1, II.C.2.
254. Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 121 (Alaska 1971) (referencing Lien
v. City of Ketchikan, 383 P.2d 721 (Alaska 1963)).
255. Id. at 122.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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Such a presumption of constitutionality would be consistent with
United States Supreme Court precedent, though such precedent is not
binding as to Alaska’s education clause. In San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,258 the Court held that “[t]he consideration and
initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation and
education are matters reserved for the legislative process of various
States, and we do no violence to the values of federalism and separation
of powers by staying our hand.”259 Centering the analysis of school
funding cases on the education clause would align state supreme court
jurisprudence with the broad deference granted by the Supreme Court to
state legislatures.
2.

Application of This Rule Demonstrates That Forward Funding of
Appropriations is Constitutional
In Alaska Legislative Council v. Dunleavy, the Supreme Court of Alaska
is presented with the opportunity to reevaluate its school funding
jurisprudence and adopt an analysis centered on the education clause.
The superior court determined that the interests of the legislature’s
appropriations clause power and the education clause duties outweigh
any implied annual appropriations model under the dedicated funds
clause.260 In inverting the calculus of this weighing test, the supreme court
should analyze whether the legislative duties under the education clause
are outweighed by any other constitutional concerns. The superior court’s
analysis strongly implies that the education clause is not outweighed by
other constitutional factors because of the legislature’s broad discretion in
its education clause duties and the fact that the proposed constitutional
issue is only implied by the text of the constitution.261
Here, the legislature expressed clear intent to act pursuant to its
education clause duties in enacting forward funding in HB 287, noting
that “[e]ducation is required by the Constitution and is a high priority
program that legislators support.”262 The legislative history demonstrates
the intent to provide budgetary stability for school districts through

258. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
259. Id. at 58.
260. Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 8.
261. See id. at 7–8 (finding clauses in the constitution cited by Defendants “at
most” collectively “express an aspiration” that appropriated funds be expended
in the following fiscal year; even if forward-funding appropriations undermined
the “spirit” of the annual appropriation model, the legislature’s “specific
prerogative and responsibility” under the education clause, in addition to its
appropriation power, would outweigh such concerns).
262. LIEBELT, supra note 16, at 9 (“Education is one of the highest priority
programs for the state . . . . HB 287 reflects the importance of education to our
state.”).
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forward funding.263 As noted in the Complaint in Intervention, forward
funding is critical to alleviate the problems caused by a misalignment
between school district and state budgeting cycles.264 The appropriations
were made to avoid the negative impact on school districts’ ability to
attract and retain quality educators.265 Because the legislature was acting
pursuant to its duties under the education clause, the burden should be
on the challenging party—here, Dunleavy, et al.—to show that other
constitutional considerations overcome the presumption of
constitutionality applied under the education clause. As the superior
court found, forward funding is not a direct violation of the dedicated
funds clause, and none of the other clauses cited by Defendants explicitly
mandate the annual budgeting model proposed by Defendants.266
Further, to the extent that an annual appropriation model is implied by
various constitutional clauses, the “appropriations here do no violence to
Alaska’s annual appropriation model.”267 Thus, in considering Alaska
Legislative Council, the court should hold that no constitutional
considerations outweigh the legislature’s broad discretion in fulfilling its
education clause duties, and forward funding of public schools is
therefore constitutional under the education clause.

V. CONCLUSION
The Alaskan variable presents the state legislature with unique
challenges, both direct and incidental, in fulfilling its constitutional duties
under the education clause. To address these challenges, the legislature
has developed creative solutions through various school funding
schemes. Such innovations should be encouraged. Though the Alaska
Supreme Court upheld recent school funding schemes, it did so under a
number of different constitutional provisions other than the education
clause. This muddies the court’s public education jurisprudence, which
initially focused heavily on the broad discretion of the state legislature
under the education clause.
In school funding cases where the legislature has demonstrably
taken action pursuant to its education clause duties, such as in Alaska
Legislative Council, the court should adopt the reasoning of the superior

263. See id. at 2 (noting the bill will “[a]llow school districts to know their state
aid in advance of passage of the state operating budget” and “[a]void unnecessary
teacher layoff notices due to passage of the state operating budget after school
districts plan their budgets”).
264. Complaint in Intervention, supra note 182, at 3.
265. Id.
266. Order re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 6–7.
267. Id. at 9.
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court in reviewing the funding scheme primarily under the education
clause and give broad discretion to the legislature. Such a holding in
Alaska Legislative Council would shift the focus in school funding cases
back to the legislature’s duties under the education clause. This analysis
of school funding cases better acknowledges the difficulties that the
Alaskan variable poses in the realm of public education, gives proper
deference to the state legislature, and recognizes that school funding cases
are public education cases that implicate the legislature’s duty to
“establish and maintain a system of public schools open to all children of
the State.”268

268. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.

